The Empty Apartment Trap: How an Unused Lease Keeps You Taxable

There is a particular kind of half-move that shows up constantly in residency disputes. Someone takes the job in Florida, or retires to Arizona, or finally leaves after the winter they had been threatening to leave over. They stop living in the old place. They do not stop having it. The lease runs another fourteen months and breaking it costs more than riding it out. The co-op has not sold and the market is soft. The kids might want it. It is a place to stay when they come back. So the apartment sits there, furnished, keys in a drawer, utility bills on autopay, and nobody sleeps in it for a year.

The instinct is that this is fine, because nothing is happening in that apartment. No one lives there. It is closed. Whatever residency risk exists must attach to living somewhere, and nobody is living there.

That instinct is exactly backwards in the two states this article covers most closely, and the reason is that the statutes are not written around living. They are written around maintaining. New York asks whether you have a residential interest in the dwelling. Minnesota puts the answer directly into its definition: an abode is a dwelling maintained by an individual "whether or not owned by the individual and whether or not occupied by the individual." An empty apartment is still maintained. That is the trap, and it is not a technicality. It is the whole first prong of the test.

This is informational and is not legal or tax advice. Whether a specific dwelling is your abode turns on your own facts, and small differences in those facts change the answer. Work through them with a qualified CPA or tax attorney.

Statutory residency in New York has two requirements and both must be met. Under Tax Law section 605(b)(1)(B), a person who is not domiciled in New York is nevertheless taxed as a resident on worldwide income if they maintain a permanent place of abode in New York for substantially all of the taxable year and spend more than 183 days of the year in the state. Exactly 183 does not do it. Neither prong does anything alone.

People who have just moved almost always focus on the second prong, because it is a number and numbers feel manageable. They track flights. They count nights. They worry about the weekend in October. And that focus is not wrong, exactly, but it is aimed at the wrong half of the test, because the day count is inert unless the abode prong is satisfied. Spend 220 days in New York with no permanent place of abode and, on the statutory residency test alone, nothing happens.

Which means the apartment decides whether the calendar matters at all. Keeping it does not make you a resident. It makes you eligible to become one on a day count you may not be tracking, in a year when you thought the exposure was already behind you. The people who get caught by this are rarely the ones who spent 250 days in New York. They are the ones who spent 190 while assuming the empty apartment had taken them out of the test entirely.

If you want to know which side of the line your own year actually falls on, the Google Timeline residency importer rebuilds the count from location history rather than from memory, which is the difference between believing you were under and knowing it.

New York has answered the empty-apartment question directly, more than once, and the answers turn on a distinction almost nobody draws on their own: whether the dwelling is unoccupied, or whether it has actually been emptied out.

Start with the older of the two answers. In Advisory Opinion Freundlich & Company, TSB-A-94(14)I, a Florida domiciliary asked about buying a New York City cooperative apartment he would use from June to September, with the apartment sitting vacant the rest of the year except for occasional gratuitous use by friends and family. The Department concluded he would be maintaining a permanent place of abode, and the Nonresident Audit Guidelines summarize the reasoning in a sentence worth reading twice: it is "immaterial that it will be vacant a portion of the taxable year," and "a residence that is owned and maintained by a taxpayer with unfettered access will generally be deemed to be a permanent place of abode regardless of how often the taxpayer actually uses it."

Now the two worked examples the guidelines use for people who are leaving, which are the closest thing New York publishes to a direct answer on this question. In the first, a taxpayer changing her domicile to Florida lists her New York home for sale. The home stays fully furnished and she keeps unfettered access, though she no longer lives there. The Department’s view is that she retains a residential interest and the home is still a permanent place of abode, "because the taxpayer continues to have unfettered access to the home which had been her primary residence in the past and no one else is using it as a residence currently." The guidelines then state the consequence plainly: "she will be subject to being a statutory resident in any year in which she spends more than 183 days in New York while the property is for sale."

The second example changes exactly one fact. Same taxpayer, same listing, except she "demonstrated that the contents of the home were moved to her Florida residence and the New York home was vacant." Now the answer flips. "In this situation, the taxpayer would not have a residential interest in the property as it would not be reasonable to expect her to use a vacant home despite having unfettered access."

Read those two side by side and the operative fact is furniture. Not the listing, not the intent, not the fact that she stopped sleeping there. A house full of her things is a house she could plausibly use. A house whose contents are now in Florida is not. Advisory Opinion TSB-A-11(9)I pushes the same point further and shows what it takes to be sure: taxpayers who moved to Connecticut and listed their New York apartment for sale were held not to be maintaining a permanent place of abode, where the listing agreement itself stipulated that they would not live in the apartment, would remove all their personal possessions, and would turn over all the keys to the listing agent.

That is the shape of the safe version. It is not "we moved out." It is documented removal of the contents and documented surrender of access, in writing, at the time.

Two decisions did most of the work of turning "you own it" into "you use it," and both are routinely oversold by people quoting them from memory.

The first is Matter of Gaied. John Gaied owned a multi-family house on Staten Island, two miles from his 24-hour service station, where his parents lived in one of the units. He paid all their expenses and admitted to staying there occasionally. The Tax Appeals Tribunal held it was his permanent place of abode on the theory that "there is no requirement that the petitioner actually dwell in the abode, but simply that he maintains it." The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, finding "no rational basis for this interpretation," and held that the taxpayer must have a "residential interest" in the dwelling, meaning "there must be some basis to conclude that the dwelling was utilized as the taxpayer’s residence."

The second is Matter of Obus v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department on June 30, 2022. The Obuses were domiciled in New Jersey and owned a vacation home in the Village of Northville, in Fulton County, while Nelson Obus commuted into Manhattan for work. The Division assessed $526,868 in income tax for 2012 and 2013, plus interest and penalties, on the theory that the Northville house was a permanent place of abode. The house was used about three weeks a year, sat roughly 200 miles from his Manhattan office, had a year-round tenant in an attached apartment, and held no personal effects of theirs, since they brought what they needed on each trip. The court held that the Tribunal had erred by looking only at the objective characteristics of the dwelling, and that to determine residential interest "it is imperative to consider a variety of factors, including the nature and duration of the use." Free and continuous access, standing alone, was not enough.

Now the part that gets left out. Neither case helps the person with the retained apartment as much as the summary makes it sound, because the subjective-use analysis attaches to the relationship prong and not to the physical one. In Matter of John J. & Laura Barker, DTA No. 822324, Connecticut domiciliaries owned a Hamptons second home they used mostly in summer, and the wife’s parents used it more than they did. The Tribunal expressly rejected the argument that "the subjective use of a dwelling by a taxpayer" determines whether it is a permanent place of abode, and found that suitability for year-round use plus "dominion and control over the dwelling" made it one. The regulation carves out only "a mere camp or cottage, which is suitable and used only for vacations," and the guidelines are explicit that limited use, even use confined to the summer months, does not make a dwelling unsuitable for year-round use. Suitability is about construction and features. It is not about your calendar.

So the line that actually runs through Gaied, Obus, and Barker is this. Whether the building could be lived in year-round is an objective question about the building, and light use does not change the answer. Whether it is your residence is a subjective question about you, and light use is one input among several. Obus won on the second question with three weeks of use, 200 miles of distance, a tenant in the other unit, and no belongings of his in the house. A furnished apartment in the city you just left, with your things in it and your key in your pocket, sits on the other side of every one of those facts.

The word doing the damage is "maintains," and New York reads it broadly enough that the absence of a lease or a deed is no defense at all.

Matter of John M. Evans, 199 AD2d 840, is the case the guidelines build the framework on. Evans was domiciled in Dutchess County and shared living quarters with a priest in a Manhattan rectory near his office, commuting in Sunday or Monday and going home on weekends. He had no lease, no deed, and paid no rent. The Tribunal held the rectory was his permanent place of abode, stating that "permanence, in this context, must encompass the physical aspects of the dwelling place as well as the individual’s relationship to the place," and that permanence "cannot be limited to circumstances which establish a property right in the dwelling place." What he did have was his own furniture and personal effects in his quarters, his own key, unfettered access, and contributions to the food and housekeeping.

On what counts as maintaining, the Tribunal was expansive: it means "doing whatever is necessary to continue one’s living arrangements in a particular dwelling place. This would include making contributions to the household, in money or otherwise." The guidelines then spell out the menu. You can maintain a residence by sharing the costs of ownership such as the mortgage, or the operating costs such as utilities or repairs, or by paying specific expenses, or by contributing in kind through repairs, cleaning, or cooking.

Apply that to the empty apartment and the picture is unflattering. Paying rent on a lease you are not using is maintaining. Paying the mortgage, the common charges, the insurance, and the electric bill on a co-op nobody enters is maintaining. Sending someone to run the water and check for leaks is maintaining. There is no version of holding the place where you are not, in the guidelines’ sense, doing whatever is necessary to continue the living arrangement.

Nor does restructuring the ownership help. In Matter of Sidney & Helen Esikoff, DTA Nos. 815861 and 815862, taxpayers transferred a New York condominium they owned into a family trust and took the position that they no longer maintained a permanent place of abode. The administrative law judge called the argument "completely specious," noting that "there is no dispute that Mr. Esikoff provided funds to a trust which used the money to maintain a residence which he and his wife utilized when they were in New York." The Tribunal sustained the determination and also sustained negligence and substantial understatement penalties under Tax Law sections 685(b) and (p). The guidelines state that the same reasoning applies to transfers into limited liability companies. Moving the title while continuing to fund and use the dwelling does not move the abode.

One narrower point is worth knowing because people reach for it. A dwelling genuinely under major renovation can fall outside the definition, since the regulation excludes a place lacking "facilities ordinarily found in a dwelling, such as facilities for cooking, bathing, etc." But the guidelines distinguish major work that makes a residence unlivable, such as inadequate plumbing or a lack of sleeping quarters, from minor repairs that merely make it inconvenient, and Advisory Opinion Marano Distante Crombie LLC, TSB-A-04(2)I, concluded that an uninhabitable apartment became a permanent place of abode once the work was completed. The burden sits on the taxpayer to produce repair bills, certificates of occupancy, or insurance claims. Gutting the kitchen the year you leave is not a plan.

New York at least gives you Gaied. Minnesota does not, and this is the single most underappreciated fact about leaving that state.

Under Minn. Stat. section 290.01, subdivision 7, a person who is not domiciled in Minnesota is still a resident for the year if they maintain a place of abode in the state and spend more than half the tax year there. The Department of Revenue states the test as two conditions: "You spend at least 183 days in Minnesota during the year (any part of a day counts as a full day)" and "You or your spouse rent, own, maintain, or occupy a residence in Minnesota suitable for year-round use and equipped with its own cooking and bathing facilities."

Read the first condition carefully, because it is stricter than New York’s. New York requires more than 183 days, so day 183 is safe. Minnesota’s threshold is at least 183, so day 183 is the day you lose. And read the second condition as the statute writes it, because this is the whole point: "abode" means a dwelling maintained by an individual, "whether or not owned by the individual and whether or not occupied by the individual," and it includes a dwelling owned or leased by the individual’s spouse.

There is no residential-interest gloss in that sentence. There is no Gaied to argue. Occupancy is affirmatively written out of the definition. The verbs are rent, own, maintain, or occupy, in the disjunctive, and satisfying any one of them is enough. An apartment you have not entered since March, on a lease you are still paying, with a stove and a shower in it, is an abode in Minnesota on the plain text.

What the definition does exclude is narrow and physical. A dwelling not suitable for year-round use, the seasonal cabin being the standard example, is not an abode, and neither is a dwelling without its own cooking or bathing facilities. Those are the exits, and they are about the building, not about you.

The one genuinely useful piece of relief is proportional. The Department states that "if you meet the first condition, but the second condition applies for less than the full year, you are considered a part-year resident for the time the second condition applied." So the date the lease actually ends is a date with tax consequences, and ending it in June rather than December is not a cosmetic difference.

This matters more in Minnesota than the state’s profile suggests, because Minnesota audits hard. Our Minnesota residency guide rates the state 5 out of 5 on exit stickiness, and the domicile analysis under Minn. R. 8001.0300 runs to roughly 26 factors covering where you vote, hold a license, register vehicles, buy hunting and fishing licenses, bank, worship, and belong to clubs, along with whether living quarters are owned or rented and how the property is classified for homestead purposes. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Larson v. Commissioner of Revenue upheld the tax court’s practice of weighing that full factor set against a taxpayer’s stated intent rather than taking a claimed move at face value, in a case where the state litigated a Nevada residency claim going back to 1998. Anyone moving from Minnesota to Florida should treat the retained dwelling and the homestead classification on it as the first two items to resolve, not the last, since homestead classification cross-checks are on the Department’s standard enforcement list.

The obvious response to all of this is to put a tenant in the place, and that response is largely correct in New York, with one trap of its own.

The guidelines are direct on the main point: "an apartment owned by a taxpayer that is rented to someone else would not constitute a PPA to that taxpayer." Better still, they extend that through the gaps between tenants. It is "true even during periods when the apartment is temporarily not being rented provided the taxpayer has made efforts to secure a new tenant and there is no evidence that it has been converted to personal use." Two conditions ride along with that: document the effort to re-let, and do not stay there yourself in the meantime. A vacancy you are marketing is different from a vacancy you are using.

The trap is short-term and seasonal renting, which people reach for because it feels like the same thing at lower commitment. It is not the same thing, and the guidelines give the counterexample explicitly. A taxpayer who rents out a Saratoga Springs home for a few months each summer "will still be determined to be maintaining a PPA in New York for substantially all of the year," because the dwelling remains "available for use on a regular, continuing basis but for occasional or brief absences including short term rentals." Handing the keys to strangers for eight weeks does not interrupt anything if you take them back.

The distinction is between giving up the dwelling and renting out around your own continued access. A one-year lease to a tenant is the first. A summer on a rental platform is the second. Advisory Opinion Marcum & Kliegman, TSB-A-04(4)I, sits on the helpful side of that line: a taxpayer who donated the use of his New York home to a charity for three months under a written lease was held not to be maintaining a permanent place of abode for substantially the entire year, which tells you the mechanism the Department credits is an actual written transfer of the right to occupy.

Statutory residency does not attach to a permanent place of abode you held briefly. Regulation 105.20(a)(2) requires that the abode be maintained for "substantially all of the taxable year," and the audit definition of that phrase moved recently in taxpayers’ favor.

Before tax year 2022, Audit Division policy defined substantially all of the year as a period exceeding 11 months. Beginning with tax year 2022, the policy defines it as a period exceeding 10 months. The guidelines are specific about when the shorter period is applied: it governs "in tax years where a taxpayer either acquires or disposes of their residence." Their own illustration is a person who works in New York City all year and starts renting a Manhattan apartment in March, who generally will not be a statutory resident that year despite spending more than 183 days in the state, because the acquisition happened mid-year.

Run that backwards and you get the practical rule for someone leaving. In the year you actually terminate the lease or close the sale, you have roughly a two-month window: dispose of the dwelling before the end of February and you have held it for less than the requisite period for that year. Hold it through the year, or into November, and the abode prong is met for the year and the only thing standing between you and statutory residency is your day count.

Two limits keep this from being a loophole. The threshold is a general rule rather than an absolute one, which the Department reaffirmed in the Marcum & Kliegman opinion. And it does not have to be the same dwelling: the guidelines state that someone who rents an apartment in Queens until June 30 and another in Nassau County from July 1 through year end is maintaining a permanent place of abode for substantially the entire year. Swapping one New York place for another restarts nothing.

For anyone moving from New York to Florida, that turns the lease end date into a planning decision rather than an administrative one. Our New York residency guide rates the state 5 out of 5 on both exit stickiness and audit aggressiveness, and the enforcement list it collects is aimed squarely at retained dwellings: utility and cable bills, STAR exemption cross-checks against nonresident filing status, cell phone location records, E-ZPass and toll records, and neighbor and informant tips. An apartment with the lights and the internet still on generates a record every month you keep it.

California does not run this test at all, and people leaving consistently misread what that means for the house they kept.

Under Revenue and Taxation Code section 17014 and FTB Publication 1031, a resident is anyone in California for other than a temporary or transitory purpose, or anyone domiciled in California who is outside the state for a temporary or transitory purpose. There is no permanent place of abode prong and no day-count trigger. Publication 1031 frames the question as where you have your closest connections, and FTB weighs a familiar set of factors: where your spouse and children live, where your principal residence is, where your license and vehicles are registered, where you vote, where your banks and professional relationships sit, the state on your last return, and your permanent employment location.

The good news is that keeping an empty apartment in California does not flip anything. There is no prong for it to satisfy. The bad news is that there is no threshold above which it becomes irrelevant either. The only bright line in section 17016 runs the wrong way for people leaving: presence in California for more than nine months of the year creates a presumption of residency, and there is no symmetrical presumption of nonresidency underneath it. So the retained California home never becomes moot the way a retained New York apartment does once you are safely under 183 days. It stays a live factor at any day count, in every year you hold it.

Appeal of Bragg, 2003-SBE-002, is where the factor list practitioners argue from comes from, and the case runs the opposite direction from the way it is usually cited: the taxpayer moved to an Arizona cattle ranch in 1993, the State Board of Equalization held he was an Arizona resident on the objective facts over his own later amended return claiming California residency for the whole year, and he was assessed anyway on the California-source portion of his covenant-not-to-compete income. Anyone moving from California to Nevada is arguing the same shape of case, and a furnished apartment across the state line is one of the connections on the list. Our California residency guide also collects the piece of this with no expiration date at all: FTB has four years to assess a filed return, but if no California return was ever filed for a year FTB believes you were a resident, there is no statute of limitations under R&TC section 19057(a).

The Florida side of these moves has its own version of the retained-property problem, running in the opposite direction. Under Fla. Stat. section 196.161, a homestead exemption a person was not entitled to can be recovered for up to 10 prior years, with a penalty of 50 percent of the unpaid taxes for each year and 15 percent interest per year. Keeping a Florida homestead on a property while filing as a resident somewhere else, or claiming it while another state is still treating you as a resident, is the mirror image of the empty apartment: a property record that says something about you that your tax filings do not.

None of this argues for selling in a bad market or eating a lease-break fee you cannot afford. It argues for knowing which of three states you are in and paying the price of that state deliberately.

Decide whether you are giving up the dwelling or keeping it. There is no ambiguous middle that the guidelines respect. Giving it up means a tenant on a real lease, or a sale, or a documented surrender of access along the lines of TSB-A-11(9)I: possessions removed, keys handed over, the restriction written into the agreement rather than described afterward.

If you are keeping it, empty it. The difference between the guidelines’ Example 2 and Example 3 is furniture and contents, and it is the single cheapest fact to change. A dwelling whose contents are demonstrably in your new state is one the Department says it would not be reasonable to expect you to use. Keep the moving inventory and the receipts. The claim is only as good as the proof that the move happened.

Then track the days as if the abode prong were met, because you should assume it is until you have made it false. That is the ordinary posture for a year in which you still hold the old place: the count is now the only thing between you and a resident return, and the states that run this test count arrival and departure days both, with any part of a day counting as a full day in both New York and Minnesota.

Watch the calendar around the disposition. In New York, the year you dispose of the dwelling is the one year the 10-month rule can carry you, and it turns on a date. In Minnesota, part-year treatment runs from the date the abode condition stops applying. In both, the end date of the lease is a tax fact, and choosing it in advance costs nothing.

Unwind the paperwork attached to the address before you unwind the address. Mail, voter registration, vehicle registration, and phone service tied to the old dwelling are listed in New York’s guidelines as evidence of a relationship to it, and in Matter of Rhoda Miller, DTA No. 812849, the Tribunal noted the taxpayer "occasionally received mail" at an apartment, including two 1099s, as part of finding it was her abode. A single account you never got around to changing is a small fact that reads badly next to a claim that you were not using the place.

And do not restructure the ownership instead of changing the facts. Esikoff is what that attempt looks like when it fails, penalties included.

The Mobility Map records days and nights by state as they happen and measures them against each jurisdiction’s own threshold, which matters here because New York’s line is more than 183 and Minnesota’s is at least 183, and a year that clears one can fail the other. Evidence Vault holds the records that decide the abode question rather than the day question: the lease and its termination, the moving inventory and receipts showing where the contents went, the listing or rental agreement and its access terms, and the utility accounts opened and closed. AuditIQ surfaces retained former-state ties that are still generating records in a state with a claim on you, including a dwelling you no longer use but still pay for. Advisor sharing lets a CPA or tax attorney review the chronology and the underlying documents directly rather than reconstructing them from memory two years later.

ResidencyIQ organizes records and highlights potential exposure factors. It is not a law firm or an accounting firm and does not provide legal or tax advice; work with a qualified CPA or tax attorney on your own domicile, filings, and state exposure.

New York’s Nonresident Audit Guidelines (December 2021) are the source of the quoted 20 NYCRR 105.20(e) definition of a permanent place of abode; the Evans discussion including the quoted "physical aspects of the dwelling place as well as the individual’s relationship to the place," the quoted statement that permanence "cannot be limited to circumstances which establish a property right in the dwelling place," and the quoted definition of maintaining as "doing whatever is necessary to continue one’s living arrangements in a particular dwelling place," along with the list of monetary and in-kind contributions; the Barker discussion including the rejected "subjective use of a dwelling by a taxpayer" argument and the "dominion and control over the dwelling" finding; the quoted "mere camp or cottage" and "facilities ordinarily found in a dwelling" language from 20 NYCRR 105.20(e)(1); the Gaied discussion including the Tribunal’s quoted "no requirement that the petitioner actually dwell in the abode" and the Court of Appeals’ quoted "no rational basis," "residential interest," and "utilized as the taxpayer’s residence" language; the Freundlich & Company (TSB-A-94(14)I) discussion and the quoted "immaterial that it will be vacant" and "regardless of how often the taxpayer actually uses it" passages; Examples 2 and 3 on the home listed for sale and their quoted conclusions; Advisory Opinion TSB-A-11(9)I and its listing-agreement facts; the quoted rented-apartment factor including the language on periods between tenants; Matter of Esikoff (DTA Nos. 815861 and 815862) including the quoted "completely specious" and Conclusion of Law G language and the penalties sustained under Tax Law sections 685(b) and (p); Marano Distante Crombie LLC (TSB-A-04(2)I) on renovations; the quoted 11-month to 10-month change in the definition of "substantially all of the taxable year," its application in years of acquisition or disposition, the March-apartment illustration, the Saratoga Springs short-term rental example and its quoted "available for use on a regular, continuing basis" language, and the Queens-to-Nassau point; Marcum & Kliegman (TSB-A-04(4)I) on the three-month charitable lease; and Matter of Rhoda Miller (DTA No. 812849) and the "occasionally received mail" finding: https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/2021/misc/nonresident-audit-guidelines-2021.pdf.

Matter of Obus v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, Appellate Division, Third Department, decided June 30, 2022 (2022 NY Slip Op 04206), is the source of the holding that free and continuous access alone does not establish a permanent place of abode and the quoted instruction that "it is imperative to consider a variety of factors, including the nature and duration of the use," along with the $526,868 deficiency for 2012 and 2013, the roughly three weeks of annual use, the roughly 200-mile distance from the Manhattan office, the year-round tenant in the attached apartment, and the absence of personal effects in the Northville home. Case summaries consulted: https://www.daypitney.com/insights/publications/2022/07/21-ny-appeals-court-holds-for-taxpayer and https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2022/12/vacation-home-not-a-permanent-place-of-abode-for-new-yorks-statutory-residence-rule. The decision itself is reported at https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-third-department/2022/533310.html.

The Minnesota Department of Revenue’s 183-day rule guidance is the source of the quoted two conditions, the quoted definition of a qualifying residence as one "suitable for year-round use and equipped with its own cooking and bathing facilities," the any-part-of-a-day counting rule, the exclusion of dwellings not suitable for year-round use and dwellings without cooking or bathing facilities, and the quoted part-year rule that applies when the second condition applies for less than the full year: https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/183-day-rule. The quoted statutory definition of "abode" as a dwelling maintained by an individual "whether or not owned by the individual and whether or not occupied by the individual" is from Minn. Stat. section 290.01, subdivision 7: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/290.01.

Fla. Stat. section 196.161 is the source of the 10-year lookback, the 50 percent penalty on unpaid taxes for each year, and the 15 percent annual interest on improperly claimed homestead exemptions: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0100-0199/0196/Sections/0196.161.html.

The residency tests, day-count thresholds, audit aggressiveness and exit stickiness ratings, enforcement method lists, and case research cited here come from ResidencyIQ’s own dossier research, with underlying citations on the New York, Minnesota, California, and Florida residency guides. That research is the source of Tax Law section 605(b)(1)(B) and the exactly-183 point, Minn. Stat. section 290.01 subd. 7 and Minn. R. 8001.0300 including the roughly 26-factor domicile test and Larson v. Commissioner of Revenue, Revenue and Taxation Code sections 17014 and 17016, FTB Publication 1031’s closest-connections framework and nine domicile factors, Appeal of Bragg (2003-SBE-002), the unlimited assessment period under R&TC section 19057(a) where no return was filed, and the enforcement method lists for New York, Minnesota, and California.